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ABSTRACT
It has now become critical and important to understanding the
nature of cyber-aacks and their impact on the physical operation
of emerging smart electricity grids. Modeling and simulation pro-
vide a cost-eective means to develop frameworks and algorithms
that address cyber-physical security challenges facing the smart
grid. Existing simulation tools support either the communication
network or the power system, but not both together. us, it is
dicult to explore the eects of cyber-physical aacks on power
system dynamics and operations. In order to bridge this gap, a
cyber-physical co-simulator is required.
In this paper, we present a novel integrated cyber-physical secu-
rity co-simulator tool capable of cyber-physical security assess-
ment (CPSA), which simulates the communication network and the
power system together. e tool identies future vulnerable states
and bad measurements and guides the operator at the control center
on taking appropriate action to minimize disruption of the physical
power system operation due to cyber-aack. e developed tool
can be used in understanding of power system monitoring, analyz-
ing the nature of cyber-aacks, detecting bad measurement data,
bad command, disabled devices and understand their impact on the
operation of the power system.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A reliable, trustworthy, and secure smart grid requires continuous,
ecient, real-time monitoring and cyber-physical security assess-
ment for increased situational awareness. It should also have the
ability to detect various types of cyber-physical aacks and be able
to quantify, characterize, and mitigate the impact of such aacks
[12]. In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of
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cyber-aacks on the smart grid, with these aacks having severe
consequences, such as blackouts and loss of condential informa-
tion in certain instances [2]. Cyber-aacks can aect the normal
operation of power system applications, such as demand response,
voltage control, device control over wide area network, etc. It can
also aect the decision making capability of an Independent Sys-
tem Operator (ISO) or Regional Transmission Organization (RTO)’s
Energy Management System (EMS), which can lead to cascading
failures and instability in the grid. Compromised condential power
system information can trigger inappropriate actions by the opera-
tors. Ultimately, cyber-physical aacks can results in permanent
physical damage to power devices in the eld.
1.1 Context and Motivation
e power system is cyber-controlled through a combination of
communications networks, embedded systems, computing resources
and soware applications. It is therefore important to understand
the interdependencies between the cyber-elements used for control,
and the operation of the power grid [11]. Dierent aack situa-
tions need to be monitored and analyzed as they take place in the
underlying communication network. Malicious aacks or system
misbehavior on the power or communication network system may
compromise power system data and may disrupt control devices
and apparatus [19].
Cyber-physical aacks typically compromise the cyber layer by
incapacitating communications devices and/or making communica-
tions resources unavailable [21]. is can cause disruptions in the
topology of the network, communication and controlling devices
in the network and eld, and communication performance (such
as link baud rate, propagation time or delay, maximum number of
packets that can be sent without major collision or packet dropping,
and maximum allowable size of each packet). However, the eect of
these aacks transcends the cyber layer, as cyber-physical aacks
can incapacitate actual power system devices. Cyber-aacks on the
smart grid range from traditional cyber-aacks, such as man-in-the-
middle [24], denial-of-service [23], replay [22] and impersonation
[3] to aacks that are cyber-physcial in nature and more specic
to the smart grid, such as bad data injection, malicious command
injection, and coordinated denial-of-service on Remote Terminal
Units (RTUs).
e current state and overall health of the power system can also
be aected by aacks over the communication network, such as de-
lay aacks, synchronous ood aacks, distributed denial-of-service
aacks on devices. During these aacks, the power system may
undergo various state transitions and eventually become insecure.
e modern smart grid is controlled using several latest wired and
wireless communication technologies, such as WiMAX and LTE,
to ensure the availability of information in an ecient manner, as
well as to monitor critical components of the entire power system,
such as , such as power equipment located in remote substations. In
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order to analyze the interdependencies of cyber and physical power
infrastructure, a cyber-physical security assessment co-simulator
must be developed.
1.2 Scope and Challenges
Existing simulators on themarket independently simulate either the
power system or the communications network [18]. For example,
PowerWorld [15] is a dedicated power systems simulator that sim-
ulates power systems dynamics and operations but assumes ideal
communication conditions in the communications layer. NS2/3
on the other hand are dedicated communication network simu-
lators that simulates communication network dynamics, but is
incapable of simulating power systems devices [10]. An integrated
cyber-physical co-simulator must be able to model and simulate the
power system as well as the communication system simultaneously
in addition to providing functionalities for assessing cyber-physical
security. e co-simulator is able to perform an assessment on
future vulnerable states, evolution of system states, and provide
situational awareness in the presence of dierent cyber-aacks [13].
Accurate modeling and simulation of the dynamic behavior of the
smart grid is quite challenging since the grid is a large and complex
system comprised of thousands of sensors and power devices, such
as generators, and transformers, etc., tied together by transmission
and distribution lines. In addition, the smart grid communications
network generally comprises thousands of communication nodes,
several communication routers, and communication and authenti-
cation servers. Hence, it is quite dicult to model and characterize
the dynamic behavior and inter-dependencies between the com-
munication and the power systems. Moreover, the co-simulator
tool must also include mechanisms to detect inaccurate behavior
of the cyber-physical system. Outlined below are the challenges
associated with modeling the detection of malicious behavior and
the incorrect operation in a cyber-physical system such as the smart
grid:
(1) Existing simulators address dierent scenarios of either the
communication system or the power system, but not both
system simultaneously taken together as a cyber-physical
system.
(2) It is hard to extend the functionality of the existing simula-
tors as most of them either do not support such an interface
or are not scalable.
(3) Existing simulation tools are not capable to detect misbe-
havior of the cyber-physical systems and their impacts.
1.3 Objective and Contributions
Our main objective in this work is to develop a fast real-time simu-
lator for the cyber-physical smart grid that can provide:
(a) A cyber-aware state estimator considering system-level
communication.
(b) Security assessment of steady-state cyber-aack impact.
(c) Overall system simulation for cyber-security assessment.
We develop a “Cyber-Physical Security Assessment (CPSA)” co-
simulator that performs real-time simulation. e approaches used
in the co-simulator are able to detect the misbehavior and anomalies
in the cyber-physical electric power system. is simulation tool
can be utilized by operators at the control center for CPSA-related
decision-making. We also develop a predictive global state estimator
at the system level that enables very fast modeling and simulation
at timescales relevant to modern and emerging power systems. e
co-simulator tool provides system level simulation to understand
the impact of cyber-aack on the power system.
1.4 Paper Organization
e rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the existing relevant literature on co-simulation and cyber-aacks’
impact. Section 3 presents the proposed system architecture along
with functional requirements and various modules of the proposed
co-simulator. Section 4 describes the overall design and implementa-
tion strategy with suitable technological platform to implement the
co-simulator. ereaer, Section 5 discusses various applications
of the developed co-simulator in the smart grid. Finally, Section 6
presents the conclusion of this work.
2 RELATEDWORK
is section presents literature work related to the co-simulator
and cyber-aack analysis.
e area of smart grid cyber-physical co-simulators and testbeds
have not been fully explored. In this direction, Davis et al. [8]
presented a survey of cyber ranges and categorize these ranges as:
(i) modeling and simulation, where models of each component exist,
(ii) ad-hoc or overlay where tests are run on production network
hardware with some level of test isolation provided by a soware
overlay, and (iii) emulation, which maps a desired experimental
network topology and soware conguration onto a physical in-
frastructure. Gluhak et al. [5] provided a survey on testbeds for
experimental Internet-of-ings (IoT) research. ese testbeds have
a dierent scope than what is presented in [8] in the sense that they
focus on specic networking technologies, such as wireless sensor
networks. Leblanc et al. [10] provided a snapshot of dierent tools
and testbeds for simulating and modeling cyber-aacks as well as
defensive responses to those.
Researchers have also identied dierent categories of aacks as
well as their defense strategies. In this direction, Chen et al. [3] dis-
cussed dierent categories of aacks: vulnerability, data injection
and intentional aacks, and analyzed network robustness. Tran et
al. [22] proposed a detection scheme for replay aacks in the smart
grid. Yang et al. [24] discussed Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)
spoof-based Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) aacks. Wei et al. [23]
performed a study on modeling Denial-of-Service (DoS)-resilient
communication routing in the smart grid. Liu et al. [13] presented a
framework that models a class of cyber-physical switching vulnera-
bilities. Etigowni et al. [4] presented a cyber-physical access control
solution by using information ow analysis based on mathematical
models of the physical grid to generate policies enforced through
veriable logic. Sgouras et al. [19] made an aempt to assess the
impact of cyber aacks on AdvancedMetering Infrastructure (AMI),
especially considering DoS and Distributed DoS (DDoS) aacks.
Researchers have developed security models and testbed setups
to simulate the behavior of cyber-aacks. In this direction, Hahn
et al. [6] introduced a security model to represent privilege states
and evaluated viable aack paths. Liu et al. [12] analyzed the
impacts of a line outage aack, DoS aack and MITM aack on the
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Figure 1: Overview of a cyber-physical power system that
consists of eight substations (SS) connected to a control cen-
ter (CC) over the wireless network and is monitored by a
global state estimator.
physical power grid using an integrated cyber-power modeling and
simulation testbed. is testbed was developed using devices, NS3,
and DeterLab with hardware components. However, the scalability
of their soware is not discussed and the simulation was performed
on the IEEE 14-bus test system.
e above mentioned solutions have limitations, which could be
further improved. In [3], [24], [19], [25], [6] and [4], the impact of
aacks on the power systemwas not studied, whereas the scheme in
[22] does not consider the source of the cyber-aacks as being from
the communication network, rather directly injected into the power
system.e simulation work in [23] only included a 3-generator
system, which is too small to fully understand the impact of these
aacks on real power systems. e communication network is not
considered when quantifying the cyber-physical system impact in
[13] and [20].
In order to accurately evaluate the current security of the power
system, a cyber-physical security assessment of the joint communi-
cation and power system is required, rather than simply examining
the cyber security concerns in purely the communication network
or the impact of physical events on the power system. However,
research in this area has not been fully explored. We tackle the
issue of monitoring the entire cyber-physical system by using a
cyber-physical co-simulator.
3 PROPOSED SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we present the overall system architecture for a
novel CPSA co-simulator that overcomes the research challenges
mentioned in the “Introduction” section and provides security as-
sessment, aack impact, and situational awareness of the cyber-
physical electricity power system.
3.1 CPSA Co-Simulator Functional
Requirements
In this section, we present CPSA functional requirements that rep-
resent the overall actions performed by the CPSA co-simulator. We
summarize these features as follows. e CPSA can:
(1) Detect real-time cyber security situations.
(2) Provide visualization and control capabilities to the opera-
tors and EMS administrator.
(3) Detect plausible contingencies that can occur in the system
as a result of cyber-aack.
(4) Enhance the security and resilience of the power system
by suggesting appropriate CPSA-driven operator actions.
(5) Generate historical logs and a trust metric(s) for dierent
components and identify weak elements, which helps op-
erators to respond quickly when a similar situation occurs
at repeated locations.
(6) Apply user-generated rules for what is considered the nor-
mal operating range.
(7) Identify and assesses the current health of the cyber-physical
system by performing cyber-physical contingency analy-
sis.
(8) Enables hashing/encryption of operator-initiated commands
and/or critical measurements.
3.2 CPSA System Module
In this section, we describe various sub-modules of the CPSA sys-
tem. Figure 1 presents an overview of the considered cyber-physical
power system consisting of eight substations connected to a control
center over the wireless network. An Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) has been mirrored at the connected port of each substation as
well as at the control center. e sub-modules of the CPSA system
are as follows:
(1) Data Management Module: is module stores all the
measurement values, legitimate as well as rogue values,
received in text les (extracted from the DNP3 packets). It
stores rogue values with a ag “up” in order to distinguish
them from legitimate data values. is module extracts
measurement values from each packet or le, and passes
them to the next module, known as the logic module. We
assume that this module can use buer storage available
at the control center for storing the packets. We presume
that the IDS can provide measurement values to the control
center in a csv le using a converter.
(2) Setup Module: is module species the user dened
rules, such as acceptable operational limits. It also pro-
vides a component-criticality metric, which clearly denes
dierent components of the cyber-physical system with
their severe criticality of loss.
(3) Logic Module: e logic modules veries the boundary
limits of each measurement value. If the module identies
bad measurement values, it separates out those values, and
sets ag “up” for those values, but still passes those bad
values in order to assess their eect on the power system
under the bad measurement injection aack scenario to
verify how much these values would impact the current
state of the system.
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Figure 2: Overall CPSA system module.
(4) Cyber-Physical System Input Modules: is module
is comprised of the enterprise communication network
model as well as the EMS power system model for the
existing cyber-physical electricity system.
(a) Enterprise Communication Network Model: It
provides input to the co-simulator regarding various
communication components. is includes the com-
munication network topology, number of connected
devices in the network, baud rate, packet size, Maxi-
mum Transmission Unit (MTU) size, and propagation
delay over the communication channel.
(b) EMS Power System Model: It provides power sys-
tem input to the co-simulator, which includes the
power system topology, dierent parameters (with
the actual value as well as acceptance ranges) for dif-
ferent components, such as transmission lines, buses,
generators, loads, shunts, and transformers, and the
conguration of the power system at the time of data
acquisition.
(5) Cyber-Physical SystemApplicationModule:ismod-
ule is the main functional and application driven module.
It runs every few (4-5) minutes to check the current health
of the system. All cyber-physical operations of the CPS
module will be performed by the application module. is
module generates a component trust metric based on the
system behavior observed by its sub-modules. Basically,
a trust metric reects the frequency of the cyber-aack
aempts on dierent components of the communication as
well as the power system. Based on the analysis and obser-
vations of this module, instructions for appropriate actions
are forwarded to the security assessmentmodule (discussed
in the next subsection) along with the component trust
metric. is module consists of two sub-modules:
(a) Communication-AwareManagementModule: It
is responsible for managing dierent components of
the communication system along with the statistics of
cyber-aack impact. Normal operations performed by
this module include frequent pings to dierent com-
munication devices to verify whether they are active
and up, maintaining log records of the communica-
tions at the control center, RTUs, and intermediate
devices, such as routers. We describe this module in
detail as follows:
(i) Communications between Dierent Com-
ponents: In order to make the simulation real-
time, communications between the control cen-
ter and RTUs through routers are provided, where
the sender can send multiple messages with
specied MTU size at one time and the receiver
responds with an acknowledge for each mes-
sage along with the action that needs to be
performed. e communication system also
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includes a propagation delay and the delay at
components for computations.
(ii) LogRecords ofCommunicationComponents:
ecommunication systemmaintains log records
at the control center, at all RTUs and at routers.
e logs include messages sent and received
by the sender and the receiver, enqueue and
dequeue timing of each packet at each router
along with sender and receiver information, and
the route followed by each message from the
source.
(iii) Evaluate SystemBehaviorwithCyber-Attacks
Scenarios: e communication system is sim-
ulated in the presence of dierent cyber-aacks
scenarios so that the overall impact and the be-
havior of the cyber-physical system can be ob-
served. Some of these aacks include man-in-
the-middle aack, denial-of-service (disabled)
aack, and delay at devices, such as routers and
RTUs. Each such aack aects the communi-
cation system components and as a results the
system behaves dierently than in normal op-
erations.
(iv) Evaluate System Behavior with Future De-
mands Scenarios: Based on future forecasts,
such as the predicted load prole and generation
dispatch (say for example, the next 30 minutes),
future states of the cyber-physical system are
observed. is enables the co-simulator to run
and evaluate system states faster than real-time.
Aer each co-simulator run of 2 minutes for 30
iterations, the system states for the next 30 min-
utes can be accurately predicted and analyzed.
(b) Power-Aware Management Module: is module
analyzes the current state of the power system by
comparing legitimate andmalicious or suspiciousmea-
surement values to evaluate their impact on the over-
all CPS security. It then simulates the what-if sce-
narios using contingency analysis. It also veries
whether the suspicious measurements should be for-
warded to other applications, if the system is still se-
cure. is module contains enhanced versions of three
core power system functions typically performed by
the EMS: global state estimation, power ow, and con-
tingency analysis.
(i) Global State Estimation:e global state esti-
mator uses measurements from all of the RTUs
to perform observability analysis. If the entire
system or a part of the system is found to be
unobservable, then the worst case scenario is
assumed for the unobservable portion(s). ere-
aer, the measurements (both legitimate as well
as malicious) are sent to the global state estima-
tor for the observable part of the system, which
assigns dierent weights to them based on their
legitimacy, identies the most likely state of the
system, and then it aempts to detect and iden-
tify bad measurements. Finally, the processed
measurements are sent on to the power ow
function.
(ii) Power Flow:eprocessedmeasurements from
the global state estimator are used to determine
the actual state of the system. ese results
serve as the pre-contingency scenario for the
subsequent contingency analysis.
(iii) ContingencyAnalysis: A list of cyber-physical
contingencies is generated. en, several dier-
ent simulation scenarios are performed to deter-
mine the potential impact of each contingency
on the power system. e worst contingencies
(above a user-dened threshold) are identied
and agged for the power system operator.
(6) Security Assessment Module: is module is speci-
cally designed for operators to analyze the CPS system
behavior based on the dierent observations provided by
other modules. is module evaluates a trust metric to g-
ure out the critical components of the cyber-physical sys-
tem, and also performs log-based analysis to verify secure
operation. It can investigate if nds unexpected behavior
in any communication or power system component. Fi-
nally, the operator concludes with decision-based analysis
and takes suitable actions in order to maintain the secure
and stable operation of the power system.
4 DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING THE
CPSA CO-SIMULATOR
Simulation is an eective way of working with very large problems
that would otherwise require involvement of a large number of
active users and resources, which is dicult to coordinate and
build in a large-scale research environment for the purpose of
investigation. Our CPSA co-simulator implements the power and
the communication systems using PowerWorld and Java (with APIs).
e interface between the power system and the communication
system is governed byMATLAB (Java⇔MATLAB⇔ PowerWorld).
ere is an active connection for the interface between Java and
MATLAB, which further calls MATLAB-PowerWorld interface.
(1) Connection for the Interface between Java-MATLAB:
We use special Java APIs, such as GridSim, Matlabcontrol,
and Java Agent DEvelopment Framework (JADE) for this
work. We provide a brief description of these APIs below:
(a) GridSim: e GridSim toolkit allows modeling and
simulation of entities in parallel and distributed com-
puting systems. It provides a comprehensive facil-
ity for creating dierent classes of heterogeneous re-
sources for solving compute and data intensive appli-
cations. e processing nodes within a resource can
be heterogeneous in terms of processing capability,
conguration, and availability [16].
(b) Matlabcontrol: Matlabcontrol is a Java API that en-
ables calling MATLAB from Java [9]. It provides the
ability to evaluate a variable (eval), a function (feval),
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and allows get and set variables from Java to MAT-
LAB.
(c) JADE: JADE is used to provide an interface between
the communication network (in Java) and the power
system (in PowerWorld) through an interface using
MATLAB. JADE is an open source middleware and a
Java-based framework that facilitates the creation of
agent based simulations by providing basic functional-
ities, such as agent and behavior classes that can easily
be extended [7]. Although many other multi-agent
frameworks are available, JADE is the most commonly
used for power system applications.
(2) Connection for the Interface between MATLAB-
PowerWorld:
(a) MATLAB: MATLAB is a powerful soware that pro-
vides a programming environment to perform com-
plex numerical computations and data analysis [14].
We use MATLAB as an interface between Java and
PowerWorld.
(b) PowerWorld: PowerWorld is a popular simulation
tool used to analyze power systems [15]. Using this
tool, we can perform power ow analysis on a system
with up to 100,000 buses. It also provides an interface
to perform other analysis, such as transient stability,
optimal power ow, voltage stability, and contingency
analysis. We use SimAuto as a COM object to control
the simulator from MATLAB and Java.
MATLAB-PowerWorld Interface: rough this inter-
face, PowerWorld can be requested to run instructions
such as the following:
(a) Open, save and close a case (network).
(b) List the devices of each type (buses, branches, genera-
tors, loads, etc.) present in the case.
(c) Get the parameters (status, MW and MVAR rating,
nominal voltage, etc.) of dierent elements or all ele-
ments of a given type.
(d) Change the parameters of an element or all elements
of a given type.
(e) Run a power ow using a specic algorithm, such as
Newton-Raphson.
JADE-PowerWorld Interface: JADE cannot directly in-
terface with PowerWorld. It must be done through MAT-
LAB. ere is no Java documentation available to directly
connect Java with PowerWorld as a COM object. A Trans-
mission Control Protocol (TCP) connection is established
to enable communication between JADE and MATLAB. A
TCP/IP connection enables running all soware on a single
computer or using a remote computer for running MAT-
LAB and PowerWorld. e connection between MATLAB
and PowerWorld is established with a COM object through
SimAuto. Single agent in JADE handles all communications
with MATLAB using InterfaceAgent. On initialization, a
TCP connection is established between InterfaceAgent and
MATLAB, and is open throughout the entire simulation
duration. JADE agent sends a message with desired action
information to InterfaceAgent using the standard Message
Transport Protocol (MTP). InterfaceAgent processes the
Figure 3: Topology for the communication network.
content of the message and sends it to MATLAB through
TCP. MATLAB receives the message, processes respec-
tive parameters, and requests PowerWorld to run the ap-
propriate instructions. Aer executing the instructions,
PowerWorld returns the result to MATLAB through the
COM interface. MATLAB then reprocesses the answer and
sends it through TCP back to InterfaceAgent. Finally, In-
terfaceAgent processes the answer it received and sends
the nal answer to the agent that issues the initial request
[17].
(3) eCommunication-AwareManagementModule:e
communications module is implemented using Java with
GridSim. In GridSim, all components communicate with
each other using message passing operations dened by
SimJava. We adopt a star topology with two intermediate
routers for routing information/messages from the control
center to the RTUs. e Communications network simula-
tions are modeled on GridSim core elements namely grid
resources, such as network links. We can specify the baud
rate for the dierent links between the control centers and
the RTUs. Routing tables stored in each router are used to
route power system information from the control center
to the RTUs and back. Figure 3 shows the topology of the
communications network in our system model.
(4) e Power-Aware Management Module: is module
provides the functionalities for global state estimation,
power ow, and contingency analysis.
(a) Global State Estimation: Currently the state esti-
mator has been implemented in MATLAB and tested
on several small power systems. e purpose of state
estimation is to identify the most likely state (bus
voltage magnitudes and angles) of the power system
using raw measurements coming from RTUs in the
eld. e formulation of the state estimation problem
is as follows:
Let z represent a set of power system measurements.
en,
z = h(x) + e,
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Figure 4: Algorithm owchart for DC contingency analysis.
where x is the estimated state vector (bus voltages and
angles), h() is the vector of functions relating the state
variables to the error-free measurements, and e is a
vector of Gaussian measurement errors with mean
of zero and variance σ 2. e Weighted Least Sqaure
(WLS) estimator minimizes the objective function:
J (x) = [z − h(x)]T R−1 [z − h(x)].
where R is a diagonal matrix of the measurement error
variances. To obtain the minimum x , we take the
partial derivative of the objective function and obtain
д(x (k )) = −H (x (k ))T R−1 (z − h(xk ))
Here, x (k ) is the state vector at iteration k . H is the
measurement Jacobian and the partial derivative of h.
By applying the Gauss-Newton method [1], we obtain
the Normal Equations
[G(x (k ))] 4x (k+1) = −д(x (k )),
where the gain matrix G is the derivative of д and is
equal to
G(x (k )) = H (x (k ))T R−1 H (x (k)).
en the state x is solved iteratively until a conver-
gence tolerance is reached.
(b) Power Flow: Currently power ow results are ob-
tained through PowerWorld via MATLAB. e pur-
pose of power ow is to determine the system state
based on bus injections. ese results serve as the
base scenario for subsequent contingency analysis.
(c) ContingencyAnalysis: Currently aDC contingency
analysis sub-module has been implemented in MAT-
LAB and tested on several small power systems for a
list of automatically generated physical contingencies.
e purpose of contingency analysis is to evaluate
the impact of possible physical contingencies on the
power system in terms of line thermal overload. See
Figure 4 for the owchart of the DC contingency anal-
ysis algorithm, where AC, DC, PTDF, LODF and CA
are acronyms for alternating current, direct current,
power transfer distribution factors, line outage distri-
bution factors and contingency analysis, respectively.
e CPSA GUI in Figure 5 presents a scenario of a polling request
initialed by the CC. e CC sends the command “Send Measure-
ment Values” to the RTUs with dierent seing preferences, and
the RTUs respond with the current measurement values of various
components. Similarly, the CPSA GUI in Figure 6 presents a sce-
nario where the CC sends one or more commands to the respective
RTU with dierent seing preferences, and the respective RTU
updates the changes for the respective power system component.
Figure 5: A polling request initialed by the CC and RTUs
reply with the current measurement values.
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Figure 6: Actions performed by the CC by sending one/more
commands to the respective RTU.
Figure 7: Maintaining log records of the communication net-
work statistics.
Figure 7 presents an overview of the log records for the communica-
tion network statistics at the CC, the RTUs, and the routers. Figure
8 presents an overview of the power system measurement values
for the co-simulator in a specic format in les received from the
RTUs, current state and values of the power system components,
and aer running power ow and contingency analysis.
5 APPLICATIONS OF THE DEVELOPED
CO-SIMULATOR
e co-simulator was made scalable by design. It can handle a small
power system case with a few tens of buses to a large system with
Figure 8: Maintaining power systemmeasurement values in
a specic format receiving from the RTUs.
ten thousand buses. e simulator is capable of monitoring the
real-time system behavior as well as the impact of cyber-aacks on
the power system. In general, this tool is relevant to the following
power system applications:
5.1 Power System Monitoring
e developed tool provides the operator with an interface to mon-
itor real-time behavior of the power system. e tool also gener-
ates system residuals and Aggregate MW Contingency Overload
(AMWCO) matrices in order to evaluate the security and health of
the power system. e tool can support dynamic power system
topology having power components ranged from several hundreds
to a thousand. We consider a 24-substation power system with 42
buses, 62 transmission lines, 8 generators, 27 loads, 6 transform-
ers, and 9 shunt capacitor banks. A visual representation of this
case is shown in Figure 9, where the blue doed lines indicate the
communication channels and solid orange lines indicate the power
lines.
5.2 Cyber-Attack Impact Evaluation
Recent cyber-aacks targeting power systems around the world
have increased the concern over the security of the grid as well as
the privacy of the information (data and commands) transmied
over the grid’s communication network. Currently, an operator
at the control center can monitor power system statistics and line
outages of dierent substations. However, the operator has no
knowledge of the security of the communication network. e ad-
versary can perform cyber-aacks over the communication network
to alter the transmied measurement data or the critical command,
and in most cases the operator will unable to detect the aacks.
erefore, we need smarter tools and techniques to detect cyber
and physical aacks over the communication network as well as
on the power system. e tool presented in the paper continuously
pings the communication devices deployed in the network and
8
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Figure 9: Visual representation of our 42-bus case.
Figure 10: Evaluating power systemhealth under normal op-
eration vs. under attack scenaio.
monitor them by modeling an identical topology in soware. e
tool is capable of identifying the situations under aacks, and is
also able to understand the worst-case impact of cyber-aacks on
the power system as shown in Figure 10.
5.3 Detecting and Ensuring Measurement Data
Under Limit
During data acquisition, the control center sends a poll request
to the substation RTU. As a response, the RTU transmits its mea-
surement data in a series of DNP3 packets to the control center.
An adversary located between the substation RTU and the control
center can compromise the transmied information of the packets,
a scenario of which is presented in Figure 11 where the measure-
ments of a specic bus (with aached generators and loads) are
altered under an aack. As a result, the power system may become
insecure. In a real world scenario, the utilities either protect their
communication networks using Virtual Private Network (VPN) or
simply do not include any protection due to the large deployment
cost. Even in the presence of a VPN network, the adversary can
modify the measurement values or the commands just before the
starting points of the VPN at the substation. e developed tool can
be easily extended and used to simulate a secure scheme applied to
the data transmied over the insecure network.
5.4 Detecting and Ensuring Transmission of
Accurate and Authentic Command Delivery
e operator at the control center is responsible for making deci-
sions based on the operating conditions of the power system. e
operator sends control commands to dierent power components
at the substation as part of its routine and emergency operations.
An adversary can aect the power system dynamics by modifying
the malicious yet valid commands over an insecure network. If the
9
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Figure 11: Bad measurement attack scenaio.
adversary has access to the control center, it can also send a mali-
cious command to execute an inappropriate action in the present
scenario to the substation device. ese actions can include open-
ing a circuit breaker, shedding load, etc. A scenario of malicious
command injection is shown in Figure 12 where the IDS alerts the
system about a bad command and the co-simulator simulates the
command before executing on the real power system. A scheme
supporting accurate and authentic command delivery can be sim-
ulated and implemented using our tool. A module at the control
center generates a fresh command and sends the command to the
respective control node with fresh information. A module at the
substation RTU is immediately activated aer receiving a command
from the control center, which could verify whether the received
command is legitimate or malicious.
5.5 Detecting a Disabled RTU Attack or
Communication Delay at a Substation RTU
Assume one or more RTUs are subject to a DoS aack, under which
an aacker delays the communication at each RTU or even blocks
the communication entirely between the CC and the RTU. Hence,
measurements for one or more substations are unavailable for state
estimation. If only one RTU is lost due to a DoS aack, the EMS
state estimator may still have global observability using CPSA, since
it may have sucient measurements in other parts of the system to
Figure 12: Bad command attack scenaio.
infer the behavior of the substation under aack. However, there
are cases where a disabled RTU will result in loss of observability
for some system states. Also, if several substation RTUs are under
DoS aacks, the state estimator will lose observability into at least
a portion of, if not the entire system. In this situation, it is dicult
to provide any input to other downstream EMS functions, such as
power ow, contingency analysis, and optimal power ow. e
operator at the control center can see these eects using the CPSA
co-simulator visualizations, as shown in Figure 9. e CPSA is able
to detect such an aack and guide operators to take immediate
action in order to mitigate the impact of such an aack on the
power system.
5.6 A Training Resource for Operators
e developed tool is an important and useful resource for training
control center sta, especially power system operators. Beer train-
ing on cyber-physical security will provide them with an enriched
experience and improve their understanding of the power system’s
behavior in the presence of potential cyber-aacks. It will also
enable the operator to further develop their decision making skills.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented and described a novel integrated cyber-
physical security co-simulator, CPSA, which can assess the impact
of the cyber-aacks on the power system. We proposed a system
architecture covering the functional requirements and system mod-
ules of the developed co-simulator, and described the dependencies
and implementation of the co-simulator using Java, MATLAB and
PowerWorld. e developed co-simulator supports the transmis-
sion of measurement data through polling request and response,
triggering a control command to a power component deployed at
a substation, and updating power system values: voltage, active
power, reactive power, and angle. At the end, we also described
various power system security applications that can utilize the
developed co-simulator.
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